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Sue Speer (in press) has done discourse researchers a favour by focusing interest on 
issues to do with status of data and the various ways in which notions of  ‘contrived’, 
‘natural’, ‘naturalistic’ and so on have been used.  She helpfully highlights a range of 
different issues and complexities, and identifies some apparent inconsistencies.  It is right that 
more explication goes on in this area.  Nevertheless, I believe that what appear to be 
inconsistencies arise mainly from discourse researchers using the notions to do two rather 
different jobs.   
Specifically, the contrived/natural distinction has been used to highlight a preference 
for materials that are not ‘got up’ or produced for a specific research task.  At the same time, 
discourse and conversation researchers are well aware of the limited sense of natural being 
developed here, and have offered cautions to that effect.  They have also noted that it is 
possible to naturalise the interaction in an experiment, questionnaire or focus group; that is, 
treat it as a topic for interactional study.  Yet treating method as topic is not the same as using 
it to find something out.  Let me consider these points in a little more detail. 
 
THE CONTRIVED/NATURAL DISTINCTION 
 
The value of this distinction is that it highlights something about most social science 
(especially in sociology and psychology) which is that it has developed using material, data, 
that is got up specifically for the research enterprise.  I do not see this as an injunction to find 
data that is ‘unbiased’ – that would be a very traditional notion of data and purity.  Rather I 
see it as highlighting the researcher’s central place in the production of conventional research 
data, and highlighting the virtue of material where the researchers active role is minimized.   
Traditionally this is material was previously seen as defying systematic research.  This 
assumption was most famously enshrined in Chomsky’s suggestion that researchers can only 
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consider underlying linguistic competence because the actual performance of talk is 
impossibly unique and messy.  Psychologists have been some of the last researchers to 
recognise the value of studying interactional material without first coding it and counting it.  
Conversation analysts and, more recently, discursive psychologists have shown just how 
effective working with natural materials can be. 
There are a number of longstanding critiques of data generated in experiments and 
other structured methods.  However, discursive psychologists often point to one or more of 
the following five virtues of natural talk. 
1) It does not flood the research setting with the researcher’s own categories 
(embedded in questions, probes, stimuli, vignettes and so on); 
2) It does not put people in the position of disinterested experts on their own and 
other’s practices, thoughts and so on, encouraging them to provide normatively 
appropriate descriptions (as many interview and questionnaire studies do); 
3) It does not leave the researcher to make a range of more of less problematic 
inferences from the data collection arena to topic (from interviews about 
counselling, say, to counselling itself) as the topic itself (counselling, perhaps) is 
directly studied; 
4) It opens up a wide variety of novel issues and concerns that are outwith the prior 
expectations embodied in questionnaires, experimental formats, interviews 
questions and so on; 
5) It is a rich record of people living their lives, pursuing goals, managing 
institutional tasks and so on. 
None of these points, in themselves, show that interviews or experiments cannot be 
useful or revealing.  However, they suggest that the justificatory boot might be better placed 
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on the other foot.  The question is not why should we study natural materials, but why should 
we not?   
 
A LIMITED NATURAL 
 
In spite of the above, Speer is quite right to point out, as others have done, that the 
notion of natural here is a rather limited one.  In studies of natural talk, data is typically 
collected from research participants who have provided informed consent, are aware of the 
recording, and may consequently modify their actions in a range of ways.  And as Speer 
notes, there are a range of practical, analytic and theoretical ways of managing these 
problems (sometimes talked of in terms of reactivity).  In addition, sociologists of scientific 
knowledge and semiologists of various kinds have undercut traditional expectations about the 
independent and timeless nature of what is seen as natural.  The idea of natural data as 
marking out a particular ontological realm in a simple way is certainly flawed. 
My suggestion has been to mark these problems linguistically by writing of 
naturalistic rather than natural data.  This allows us as researchers to mark the useful contrast 
between data that is got up and data that is, at least ideally, not, while recognising the limits 
on that distinction.  Another way into this is to avoid the troubling term ‘natural’ and focus on 
the issue of researcher agency.  As Speer notes, I have suggested a (conceptual) dead social 
scientists test – would the data be the same, or be there at all, if the researcher got run over on 
the way to work?  An interview would not take place without the researcher there to ask the 
questions; a counselling session would whether the researcher turns up to collect the 
recording or not. 
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NATURALISING METHODS INTERACTION 
 
Speer highlights work by conversation analysts and discursive psychologists that 
takes method as its topic – the interaction in a structured survey, say, or a focus group.  She 
takes from this that anything that can be studied can be naturalised, and that this breaks down 
the contrived/natural distinction.  While this is an important point, I do not think it blunts the 
force of the distinction.   
Take the study Claudia Puchta and I did of questions in focus groups (Puchta & 
Potter, 1999).  This took as its topic records of interaction in focus groups, and in particular 
the ways questions are designed and the interactional consequences of different designs.  
However, doing this did not involve endorsing (or, indeed, criticising) the use of focus groups 
to study particular questions.  This study had a quite different objective, which was to 
consider how a bit of social research practice gets done.  Put simply, the possibility of 
studying how a particular bit of social research is contrived does not show that the 
contrived/natural distinction is not useful.   
Taking a naturalistic stance to a social research method is very different from using 
that method to do research.  Traditional interview studies are not focused on their 
interactional organization; they are drawing on a research procedure that is taken to generate 
interesting data.  Typically, the more this data is seen as an interactional product the less 
interesting it is seen to be.  That is not to say that important studies have not been done using 
interview material (Speer cites several).  However, even when naturalised for study, their 
status as got up by the researcher is still something to be grappled with.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
These are complicated issues and Speer has done a useful job highlighting some of 
their convolutions.  However, I think that the conceptualisation in this area has been rather 
more coherent than Speer allows.  While there are limits to the notion of naturalistic data, this 
does not mean that it is much the same sort of thing as focus group, interview or experimental 
interaction.  There is a world of difference between the material gathered in a questionnaire 
from the record of an everyday phone conversation; what is gained by studying a video of a 
family therapy session is very different from the retrospective accounts of participants.  If 
anything, one of the successes of work in discourse and conversation analysis been in 
showing up just how complex and subtle researcher guided interaction in interviews, focus 
groups and other research arenas is.  Studies of questionnaires and focus groups have 
highlighted the delicate ways in which the researcher generates countable findings or 
conventional social science objects such as attitudes (e.g. Antaki, et al., 2000; Puchta & 
Potter, in press).  The distinction may be rather more complex than previously thought, but 
the points it is used to make are no less important. 
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